Ireland, Austria, Switzerland, Norway and New Zealand are said to be sceptical of the deal, and we are sceptical ourselves. There should be more information so that we can have added confidence on what non-proliferation benefits an exemption may bring.

Survivors of the atomic bombing from Nagasaki have appealed to the Nuclear Suppliers Group not to give India the waiver it seeks. An appeal by some survivors of the Nagasaki bombing to the Nuclear Suppliers Group may give India a reason to be wary of the smooth progress of the nuclear deal. The survivors are bitterly critical about their country, Japan. Other countries, such as Iran and North Korea may find that this exemption to India will allow them to continue with their own nuclear plans, and may arguably open the floodgates to chaos.

There is a fear that exporting nuclear fuel and technology to a country that has not signed the NPT could set a dangerous precedent and weaken efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and materials. India did develop its own nuclear arms in secret and Iran would likely argue that if they are allowed the exemption then they would almost be rewarded for this fact, whereas Iran is under UN sanctions for the same reason.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was set up under the auspices of the five Nuclear states: the US, UK, France, China and USSR, whose place was adopted by the Russian Federation. The principle of the Treaty was to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and was effective in doing so based on the mutual obligation it placed upon those nations.
Aside from the idea of a "nuclear deterrent" which is provided by the 5 nuclear states, the other main motivation for states not to develop weapons was the provision made for the sharing of energy capabilities. This has been effective because, historically, the nuclear states are those with the expertise on nuclear energy.
India is a state which has unilaterally developed nuclear capabilities and failed to even sign significant unilateral treaties of non-proliferation, let alone the multilateral NNPT. By providing it with nuclear energy support, the international community severely undermines both the principle of the NNPT to use the sharing of technology as a reward for and incentive towards non-proliferation, and its practical enforceability with other nations who have developed or may consider developing nuclear weapons.

India’s development of nuclear weapons was primarily the result of an arms race with its neighbour, Pakistan: on numerous occasions, weapons tests have been used as a demonstration of power, followed swiftly by tests from the other side. This military posing continues to the present day, with ongoing tensions over issues including a border dispute around the Kashmir region.
In recent years, Pakistan’s nuclear programme has come under fire from other states, following the leaking of information to rogue states by one of the nation’s top scientists, and questions over the security of its weapons after a number of attacks on Pakistani military bases by Islamist insurgents and the nation’s political instability.
Given that concerns over the other’s nuclear programmes are the chief reason why neither Pakistan nor India have ever signed the NNPT- and are the only countries never to have done so- it is questionable whether giving India nuclear energy concessions without making demands upon its nuclear weapons capabilities is a wise move in the long-term efforts to disarm both nations. Not only will this show of favour towards India strain relations between Pakistan and the international community, it will also lessen the chance of them signing the NNPT, which it will now recognise as a defunct treaty which can be ignored by nuclear armed states.